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"FLIR"TING WITH DANGER:
A FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
OF INFRARED IMAGING
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
stands as a safeguard of every individual's right of privacy.' Spe-
cifically, the Fourth Amendment serves to protect people from un-
warranted governmental intrusion.2 Government access to ever-
advancing technology3 for purposes of surveillance, however, nec-
1 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). "The overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intru-
sion by the State." Id.; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). "[The Framers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone- the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by
civilized Men." Id.; 1 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONsTrruTIONAL RIGHTs OF THE ACCUSED 291-92 (2d
ed. 1985) (quoting Flagg v. United States, 233 F. 481, 482 (2d Cir. 1916)). "The Fourth
Amendment was 'intended to safeguard the rights of the people of the United States
against the encroachment of unlawful and arbitrary powers and to preserve the rights of
the humblest as well as the most powerful citizen.'" Id.; see also Anthony Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REv. 349, 357-58 (1974) (discussing
Fourth Amendment protection of individual privacy); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of
Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1357-74 (discussing Fourth Amendment as one of several
constitutional sources of privacy).
2 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 186 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"The Fourth Amendment... was designed, not to prescribe with 'precision' permissible and
impermissible activities, but to identify a fundamental human liberty that should be
shielded forever from government intrusion." Id.; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703(1983). "We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to jus-
tify the intrusion." Id.
3 See Shannon Brownlee, Science Takes the Stand, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 11,
1994, at 29. The article examines the controversy over the use of DNA profiling both as
evidence generally and specifically with regard to the O.J. Simpson trial. Id. The author
states that "[there is no argument that DNA patterns from a crime scene that do not
match a suspect's can lead to speedy exoneration." Id. Furthermore, "DNA profiling gets
controversial only when a match is made." Id. Critics of the use of DNA evidence argue that
"prosecutors have exaggerated the rarity of various DNA profiles" and that "labs perform-
ing the delicate analysis are not subject to adequate quality controls." Id. at 29-30; see also
Gordon Witkin & Katia Hetter, High-Tech Crime Solving, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
July 11, 1994, at 30. The automated fingerprint identification process allows "computerized
storage and rapid matching of new prints against a police department's or a state's entire
inventory-perhaps millions of fingerprint records." Id. The "Bulletproof" computer system
"takes a 360-degree picture of a bullet's ballistic characteristics, then compares it with
others stored in a database to isolate a small universe of potential matches." Id. A voice
spectrograph "generate[s] pictures of recorded voices that graphically display fluctuations
in pitch and tone, and then compares them with others . . . ." Id. A hand-held wand dis-
perses a fluorescent dye vapor which "reacts with the moisture and oil of the fingerprint,
freezing the print so it cannot be harmed." Id. See generally PAUL C. GL HELLI & EDWARD
J. IMWINKELRIED, SciENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-8 (2d ed. 1993) (examining reliability of evi-
dence derived by various scientific techniques); EDWARD J. IMWRNKELRIED, THE METHODS OF
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essarily implicates this privacy interest.4 New technological de-
vices are extremely valuable to law enforcement because they pro-
vide more efficient and effective means for police departments to
combat crime.5 Areas once beyond the reach of conventional sur-
veillance are now readily accessible as a result of more sophisti-
cated devices.6 Increasingly, these devices are utilized in efforts to
curb drug infestation7 in the United States.8 Though such devices
are helpful to the police, their use has sparked constitutional de-
ATrACKING SciNTI c EVIDENCE 415-17 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing role of various types of
scientific evidence at trial).
4 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"[Tihe concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment
vanish completely when we slavishly allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming
law and order, efficiency, and other benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and
doors which men need to shield them from the pressures of a turbulent life around
them and give them the health and strength to carry on .....
Id.; United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 207-08 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995). The court recognized the "tension created be-
tween the right to privacy on the one hand and our society's rapidly evolving technological
sophistication on the other." Id.; State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
(quoting State v. Lange, 463 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)). "[Tlhere must be a
limit to the degree the government can intrude upon a person's home and curtilage with
'high-tech' equipment." Id.; see also Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 386 (quoting Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961)). "In recent years... rapid technological advances
and the consequent recognition of the 'rightening paraphernalia'.., have underlined the
possibility of worse horrors yet to come." Id.
5 See JeffFrank, Out of the Darkness, SECURIrY MGM r, Aug. 1991, at 45 (discussing frus-
trated security and law enforcement communities' continued struggle against darkness
that has always shielded nighttime crime); see also W. Conard Holton, Shedding New Light
on Crime, PHOTONICS SPECTRA, Dec. 1992, at 52. "A market for photonic technologies exists
in law enforcement." Id.; Witkin & Hetter, supra note 3, at 30. According to a Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms spokesman, law enforcement officials are "literally able
through automation to do the grunt work of a small army of forensic examiners ... ." Id.
The Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("AFIS") "can whiz through 1,200 prints
per second and in a few hours kick out possible matches, yielding suspects the cops never
knew about." Id.
6 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). As
long ago as 1928, Justice Louis Brandeis perceived that "[d]iscovery and invention have
made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the
rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet." Id.
7 See, e.g., Mary H. Cooper, War on Drugs, CONG. Q. RESEARCHER, Mar. 19, 1993, at 243.
The author notes that "[flederal spending to combat drugs has increased from $1.5 billion
in 1981 to almost $12 billion in 1992" and yet the United States is "the world's leading
market for illegal drugs." Id.; Derek T. Dingle, Managing the War on Drugs, BLACK ENTER-
PriSE, July 1990, at 43. "As of March [1990], [National Institute of Drug Abuse] research
indicated that two-thirds of Americans, between the ages of 20 and 40, have used an illicit
drug in the past year while 12% have done so within a 30-day period." Id.; Kitty Dumas,
War on Drugs Is a Standoff In the Partisan Trenches, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Apr. 6, 1991, at
858 (reporting estimated cocaine use by 1.7 million Americans more than once per week);
Risky Business, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1990, at 16 (discussing military involvement in war on
drugs).
8 See Marijuana Retains Popularity Despite Anti-Drug Attitudes, DALLAS TwEs HERALD,
Nov. 18, 1990, at A6 (noting that "[plolice departments that once paid little attention to
marijuana have changed as attitudes harden toward all illegal drugs").
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bate. 9 One recent advent is use of the Forward Looking Infrared
Device ("FLIR") in an attempt to detect indoor marijuana1 ° grow-
ing operations.'1
This Note evaluates FLIR use in light of the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection of individual privacy. Part One examines the
Fourth Amendment, primarily in the context of the standard for
police searches which courts currently apply. Part Two discusses
the scientific principles underlying thermal imaging technology.
Part Three argues that warrantless FLIR use for detection of in-
door marijuana growing operations is unconstitutional. Part Four
proposes a new approach, consistent with the principles underly-
ing the Fourth Amendment, to determine whether use of the FLIR
or other new technological devices is within constitutional
boundaries.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). The Supreme Court held that
warrantless monitoring of an electronic beeper inside a private home violated the Fourth
Amendment because the container containing the beeper was withdrawn from public view.
Id.; United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 208 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995). "We must take care that the war on drugs does
not count as one of its victims fundamental rights." Id.; State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601
(Wash. 1994). "The Supreme Court has differentiated between the use of sensory enhance-
ment devices in homes from their use on other objects." Id.; Hearings on Surveillance Tech-
nology Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975) (statement of Sen. Tunney). "Control over the
technology of surveillance conveys effective control over our privacy, our freedom and our
dignity-in short, control over the most meaningful aspects of our lives as free human
beings." Id.; Gormley, supra note 1, at 1370. "What is most telling about the recent Fourth
Amendment privacy cases, however, is that the Court seems to be especially heavy-handed
in discounting the 'reasonableness' of the citizen's expectation of privacy where the individ-
ual's claim to secrecy or solitude collides with the government's war on drugs and alcohol."
Id. "Particularly where drug and alcohol crack-downs motivate the search, individual 'ex-
pectations' become quickly minimized in the name of society's massive stake in eradicating
drug traffic and drunk driving... Fourth Amendment privacy deals exclusively with gov-
ernment conduct, constantly pitting the individual against society, often (as in the drug
and alcohol cases) with massive odds stacked in favor of the states." Id. at 1372. See gener-
ally Matthew Lippman, The Drug War and the Vanishing Fourth Amendment, 14 CRIm.
JUST. J. 229, 308 (1992) (examining several recent Supreme Court decisions involving nar-
cotics and concluding Court clearly demonstrated narrow Fourth Amendment interpreta-
tion and consequently sacrificed individual privacy).
10 Various sources have referred to "marijuana" by any one of the following terms: can-
nabis, dope, gonja, grass, hash, hashish, hemp, herb, Mary Jane, pot, reefer, smoke, and
weed. See MERRmAM-WEBsTER'S COLLEGIATE THESAURUS 468 (Maire Weir Kay ed. 1988)
(noting alternative terms for "marijuana").
11 See, e.g., TERMAL DETECTION TECHNOLOGY: AN ASSESSMENT FOR DRUG LAw ENFORCE-
ENT [hereinafter DRA Manual] at 4. The indoor cultivation of marijuana "result[s] in de-
tectable amounts of thermal energy." Id. "Recent design advancements making thermal
detection equipment more portable coupled with the increasing need for specialized drug
investigative surveillance capability has resulted in a renewed interest in the technology
by law enforcement." Id. at 3.
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I. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS PURSUANT
To KATz v. UNITED STATEs
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized. 12
The history of the Fourth Amendment envinces that the Fram-
ers of the Constitution intended to limit the scope of governmental
power over citizens. 13 The Framers, all too familiar with the ram-
pant abuses of general warrants by British soldiers,' 4 sought to
establish a minimum threshold for police intrusion into citizens'
privacy.15
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13 See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 1, at 1358-59. "A requirement of particularized war-
rants to guard against unreasonable searches and seizures was embodied in the Fourth
Amendment, largely in response to the use of general warrants and writs of assistance by
the British, by which.., soldiers conducted wide-roaming searches of colonists' homes and
private affairs for contraband." Id.
14 See, e.g., M.H. SmrTH, THz WRrrS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 344 (1978) (quoting John Ad-
ams in the Massachusetts Spy of Apr. 29, 1773). "Custom-house officers may enter our
houses when they please-we are commanded to permit their entry-their menial ser-
vants may enter-may break locks, bars and every thing in their way-and whether they
break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire-bare suspicion without
oath is sufficient." Id. John Adams further stated:
It appears to me... [the writ of assistance is] the worst instrument of arbitrary power,
the most distrustive [sic] of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of the con-
stitution, that ever was found in an English law-book .... Every man prompted by
revenge, ill humor or wantonness to inspect the inside of his neighbor's house, may get
a writ of assistance; others will ask it from self defense. One arbitrary exertion will
provoke another until society will be involved in tumult and in blood.
Id. at 552-54; see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1 (1978). "One of the points emphasized in the ratification debates
was the need for a provision dealing with searches." Id. See generally JACOB W. LANDYNSKi,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT; A STUDY IN CONSTIrTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION 19-48 (photo. reprint 1991) (1966) (examining in detail development of Fourth Amend-
ment); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTrrUTION 51-78 (1937) (discussing history surrounding adoption of
Fourth Amendment).
15 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963). "[The Constitution
requires] that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer.., be interposed be-
tween the citizen and the police .... " Id.; RICHARD B. McNAMARA, CONSTrruTIONAL LmTA-
TIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 28 (1982). "IThe framers sought to safeguard the privacy
and security of citizens' homes by requiring that the decision to invade that privacy be
made by a neutral and detached magistrate, and not by a police officer engaged in the often
competitive business of ferreting out crime." Id.; Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 403.
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Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a police officer must make
a showing of probable cause to obtain a warrant to search an indi-
vidual's home.16 In applying for a search warrant, an officer must
establish that evidence of a crime is presently to be found at the
location to be searched. 17 Nevertheless, prior to determining
whether probable cause exists, one must first ascertain whether
the Fourth Amendment is invoked at all.'
The Fourth Amendment, by its own terms, extends only to
"searches" and "seizures."19 Thus, the starting point for analysis of
the constitutionality of a government action is a determination of
whether the particular action at issue constitutes a "search" or
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2 ° This
discussion will consider only the "search" aspect of the Fourth
Amendment. 2 ' If the activity in question does not constitute a
"search," then it does not fall within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment.2 2 An action that constitutes a "search," however,
"[W]hether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go
unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to
citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open
society." Id.
16 See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). "Belief, however well founded,
that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a
search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstand-
ing facts unquestionably showing probable cause." Id.
17 See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3(a) (2d ed.
1992). "In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence: that
the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,
and that the items will be found in the place to be searched." Id.
18 See infra note 20 (noting starting point in Fourth Amendment analysis is determina-
tion of whether amendment is applicable).
19 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). A seizure occurs "when there
is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in the property
seized." Id.
20 See, e.g., CHARLEs H. WHITBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.01 (1980). "The first step
one must take in examining a search and seizure case is to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment is implicated at all." Id.
21 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment "protects
two types of expectations, one involving 'searches,' the other 'seizures.' Id. A 'search' occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.
Id. A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an indi-
vidual's possessory interests in that property." Id.
The author's inquiry is limited to the "search" aspect of the Fourth Amendment because
use of the FLIR in no way "seizes" anything within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment;
State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601-04 (Wash. 1994). The scanning of a home to detect the
amount of heat it is emitting may, however, constitute a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
22 See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 388. "[Ihf [a police activity] is not labeled a
'search' or 'seizure,' it is subject to no significant restrictions of any kind." Id. "It is only
'searches' or 'seizures' that the fourth amendment requires to be reasonable: police activi-
ties of any other sort may be as unreasonable as the police please to make them." Id.; see
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triggers the Fourth Amendment and is subject to all its
provisions.23
In determining whether a "search" has taken place, the
Supreme Court, since the seminal 1967 case of Katz v. United
States,2 4 has focused on the individual's expectation of privacy.2 5
In Katz, the petitioner appealed from a conviction for transmitting
wagering information by telephone across state lines in violation
of a federal statute.26 At trial, the government introduced record-
ings of the petitioner's telephone conversations, obtained by an
electronic recording device attached to the outside of the public
telephone booth which he had used.27 In reversing the conviction,
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment entitled the
petitioner to believe that his conversation would remain private.2"
In reaching this conclusion, the Court dismissed the notion that
physical intrusion is a prerequisite to the occurrence of a search.29
Though agreeing that the conviction should be reversed, Justice
Harlan chose to concur in order to solidify the expectation of pri-
vacy inquiry used by courts. 30
Justice Harlan's concurrence proposed a twofold requirement,3 '
under which a court must first determine whether the individual
also Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1207 (1983). "If an activity is not a search or seizure ... then the government
enjoys a virtual carte blanche to do as it pleases." Id.; RONALD J. ALLEN & RicHARD B.
KuHNs, CONsTrrTrIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 499 n.1 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that "deciding
that government activity is not a search or seizure" is one way of "insulating the activity
from Fourth Amendment restrictions.").
23 See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 388. "[Wlherever [the Fourth Amendment] re-
stricts police activities at all, it subjects them to the same extensive restrictions that it
imposes upon physical entries into dwellings." Id. Therefore, "[t]o label any police activity a
'search' or 'seizure' within the ambit of the amendment is to impose those restrictions upon
it." Id.; see also Horton, 690 F.2d at 476. "The decision to characterize an action as a search
is in essence a conclusion about whether the Fourth Amendment applies at all." Id.
24 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Mohan Mankani, 738 F.2d 538,542 (2d Cir. 1984). "Whether
overhearing this conversation constituted an unlawful search or seizure in violation of
Fourth Amendment rights depends on whether these defendants under the circumstances
had a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id.
26 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 353.
2 Id.
30 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). "My un-
derstanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.'" Id.; see also United States v. Mohan Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citation omitted). "Analysis must begin with Katz v. United States, which established the
[Vol. 10:651
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challenging the alleged "search" manifested a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy.3 2 If the individual displayed such an expectation,
the court must then determine whether that expectation is one
which society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable. 3
If both conditions are satisfied, then a search, within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, has occurred.3 4 As a result, the acting
arm of the government must have had a search warrant, based
upon probable cause, at the time the state obtained the evidence
in order for the search to have been constitutional.35 In the ab-
sence of such a warrant, the evidence obtained would ordinarily be
inadmissible pursuant to the exclusionary rule.36
Courts have applied Justice Harlan's two fold test in numerous
cases involving the utilization of sense-enhancing devices.37 Due
expectation of privacy rationale as the touchstone governing the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment protection." Id.
32 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (reversing dismissal of con-
viction based on evidence obtained from warrantless search of defendant's garbage). The
Supreme Court first analyzed respondents' assertion that they had manifested an expecta-
tion of privacy as to their trash. Id. The Court considered the fact that the trash was con-
tained in an opaque plastic bag, left at curbside and was expected to be commingled with
other trash. Id.
33 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (determining there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in open field of marijuana). "The [Fourth] Amendment
does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those [expectations]
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. (second alteration in original);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). "The second
question is whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is 'one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'-whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the indi-
vidual's expectation, viewed objectively, is justifiable' under the circumstances." Id.
34 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39. "The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage
bags left at the curb outside the Greenwood house would violate the Fourth Amendment
only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that
society accepts as objectively reasonable." Id.
35 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. "[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval of judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Id.; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984). The Supreme Court created a
"good-faith" exception which allows the evidence to be used if a police officer reasonably
relies on an apparently valid warrant which is later determined to be defective. Id.
36 See LAWRENCE C. WADDINGTON, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3 (1974). "The exclu-
sionary rule was a judicially created rule of evidence barring judges and juries from consid-
ering any evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment-no matter how relevant
and material to the issue on trial-in determining guilt or innocence." Id.; see also Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961) (extending exclusionary rule to states). See generally
Thomas F. LaMacchia, The Exclusionary Rule, 81 Gzo. L.J. 1013, 1016-27 (1993) (tracing
development of exclusionary rule); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond:
The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1372-77 (1983) (examining adoption of exclusionary rule).
37 See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 n.5 (1986) (noting photo-
graphs taken of Dow's plant do not infringe on any reasonable expectations of privacy);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (recognizing individuals' privacy inter-
est in contents of personal luggage); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)
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to technological advances, investigating officers are now able to
detect activity and objects otherwise undetectable by the human
senses alone. 38 Generally, courts have been willing to permit the
use of devices which merely served to enhance the basic human
senses. 39 Courts have been reluctant, however, to grant complete
freedom in this area and have thus held the use of some devices to
be a "search."4 ° The FLIR is an example of such a device which
has left courts divided as to the constitutionality of its use.41
II. INFRARED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY
The FLIR is capable of portraying visual images of heat radiat-
ing from a target source.42 Infrared radiation is that part of the
electromagnetic spectrum which is just beyond visible light, and
thus undetectable by the naked eye.43 Any object with a tempera-
ture above absolute zero will emit infrared radiation.4 4 The
(noting person traveling in automobile on public road has no reasonable expectation of
privacy).
38 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (noting monitoring of beeper re-
vealed presence of container within home, a fact not visually verifiable); Place, 462 U.S. at
707 (noting ability to detect presence of contraband within luggage without exposing re-
maining contents).
39 See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239 (holding use of sophisticated camera from public
airspace to take pictures of industrial complex does not constitute search); Place, 462 U.S.
at 707 (holding use of trained narcotics detection dog on temporarily seized luggage at air-
port does not constitute search); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (holding tracking of beeper located
within suspect's automobile does not constitute search).
40 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (holding monitoring of beeper while in home constitutes
search because it reveals information otherwise undetectable by visual surveillance).
41 See infra note 62 (noting split in authority on constitutionality of FLIR use).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994). The report
and recommendation of the magistrate stated:
To use the Stinger, [a thermal imaging device,] the operator first warms up the imager
and adjusts the controls so that the view screen shows actual objects with somewhat
less detail than a television picture. Then the operator adjusts the brightness and gain
so that there is a neutral starting position that will allow hotter and cooler objects to be
visualized. The Stinger uses a "gray" scale, with white being the visual representation
of the hot end of the scale and black being the visual representation of the cold end of
the scale. "Hot" and "cold" are relative terms because the [device] does not quantify
temperature; it simply provides a visual image showing which objects are radiating
more or less heat than the baseline set by the operator during warmup. Often, but not
always, the baseline will be the air temperature, the normal temperature of the struc-
ture being viewed, or both, since they tend to be the same at the time the [device] is
used.
Id.
43 See LAURENCE PRINGLE, RADIATION: WAVES AND PARTIcLEs/BENFTrs AND RISKS 7
(1983). In approximately 1800, Sir William Herschel, an English astronomer, discovered
infrared energy. Id. The name of this radiation derives from "infra," which means "below,"
because the radiation has a lower frequency than visible light. Id.; MICHAEL I. SOBEL,
LIGHT 19 (1987). Infrared radiation, although invisible, is reflected and refracted in a simi-
lar manner to light. Id.
44 See SOBEL, supra note 43, at 19 (discussing sensation of heat produced by radiation).
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greater the temperature of an object, the greater the amount of
infrared radiation it emits.4 5 The FLIR does not quantify tempera-
ture, but rather displays on a view screen the relative amounts of
heat being emitted from all objects scanned.46 The device is used
either aerially, as when mounted to a helicopter, 47 or from ground-
level.48
While private industry recently started using thermal imaging
for a variety of purposes,4 9 the government has been using it since
the 1950s.10 Law enforcement agencies 51 are increasingly using
45 Id. at 75. "The hotter the object is, the greater will be the total amount of radiation
coming from a given surface area." Id.
46 See, e.g., Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522 (discussing capabilities of FLIR in distinguishing
relative amounts of heat between objects scanned); see also Transcript of Evidentiary Hear-
ing at 51, United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1531-32 (1994) (noting supersensitive
FLIR capability indicating different images based upon differences of merely one degree
Fahrenheit); DEA Manual, supra note 11, at 4 (confirming system sensitivity as accurate
as one degree and noting object's temperature is not measured).
47 See Holton, supra note 5, at 52 (noting FLIR can be installed in gimbals on light
planes or helicopters); see also Paul Proctor, Police Unit Expands Capabilities With Flir-
Equipped Helicopters, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 15, 1986, at 90 (noting FLIR
use on single-engine helicopters).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (D. Wyo. 1994) (noting FLIR
can be "hand held unit"), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th
Cir. 1995); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (stating officer ex-
amined defendant's home with thermal imager from parked vehicle).
49 See, e.g., United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 223 n.4 (D. Haw. 1991),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Feeney 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993). Uses of FLIRs in-
clude the "identification of inefficient building insulation, the detection of hot, overloaded
power lines, and the detection of forest fire lines through smoke." Id.; DEA Manual, supra
note 11, at 3. "Civilian application of the technology has been lacking, but this trend is
changing as the technology has become less expensive, more mobile, and easier to operate
and maintain." Id. "Some of today's common, nonmilitary applications are: moisture detec-
tion in roofs, building energy loss surveys, and electrical-mechanical preventative mainte-
nance evaluations." Id.; Arthur Stout, IR Images Aid Environmental Sleuths, PHOTONICS
SPECTRA, Dec. 1991, at 117 (noting use of infrared thermography to locate underground
objects due to heating and cooling rate differences between objects and surrounding soil).
50 See, e.g., DEA Manual, supra note 11, at 3 (reporting military use of thermal detection
technology since 1950s); see also Frank, supra note 5, at 45. "IR [Infrared Radiation] cam-
eras can even detect whether a vehicle has been moved from an area by sensing the ther-
mal energy left by the vehicle at its previous location." Id. "IR images can also help ascer-
tain whether guns or explosives have been fired or detonated recently." Id.; Stuart W.
Greenwood, The Application of Imaging Sensors to Aircraft Landings in Adverse Weather,
MICROwAVE J., Sept. 1992, at 80. FLIRs are also used to aid in aircraft landing under condi-
tions of reduced visibility. Id.; Proctor, supra note 47, at 90. FLIRs are used by police de-
partments to conduct searches for lost children and the searches are faster and more cost-
effective than conventional manpower searches. Id. In addition, the FLIR is "capable of
picking out abandoned getaway cars from crowded parking areas by the heat generated by
their tires, engine and exhaust system." Id. at 93; Arthur Stout, IR Images Track Heat
Sources To Make Things Smarter, R & D MAG., Feb. 1992, at 46. "[Infrared thermography]
was ... largely responsible for the [Persian Gulf] war's brevity, as IR-equipped aircraft and
tanks found their Iraqi targets with unerring accuracy." Id.
51 See, e.g., United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 208 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (noting
surveillance is sometimes conducted by Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force Of-
ficers), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995).
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the FLIR in an attempt to uncover indoor marijuana growing 5 2
operations. 53 Such operations require light sources 54 which gener-
ate large amounts of heat;55 it is this heat that is susceptible to
detection by the FLIR.56 Police officers use high heat readings to
support an application for a warrant to search the premises from
which the reading was obtained.57 A number of defendants who
have been prosecuted on the evidence obtained from these
searches have challenged FLIR use as a violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights.58
52 See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 224 (noting marijuana growers' preference for in-
door cultivation since it is not dependent on weather conditions and cannot be detected by
naked eye); Terry Glavin, Growing Their Own Way, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 11, 1992, at Al
(estimating earnings can reach as much as $3,000 per plant per year); Marijuana Retains
Popularity Despite Anti-Drug Attitudes, DALLAS Tams HERALD, Nov. 18, 1990, at A6 (not-
ing marijuana as most popular illegal drug as of 1990); Joseph B. Treaster, Urban Grow-It-
Yourselfers Cash In on Marijuana, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 5, 1994, at B3 (discussing extensive
practice of indoor marijuana growing in New York City); Gordon Witkin, Inside the High-
Flying Pot Industry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 6, 1989, at 27, 28 (noting govern-
ment crackdowns on foreign marijuana and domestic outdoor growing have led to increase
in indoor growing operations).
63 See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 30, United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp.
1518, 1521-22 (W.D. Wis. 1994). During direct examination, Captain Russell, the officer
who took the FLIR readings, discussed his training for FLIR operation as 10 days in a Drug
Enforcement Agency thermal imagery system course. Id. "[Tihe majority of the course was
designed for the indoor marijuana growing operation portion of it." Id.
54 See, e.g., Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 222 (noting lights used in marijuana growing
operation were "of the thousand watt variety"); Ed Rosenthal, Pot Moves Inside, WHOLE
EARTH REV., Spring 1987, at 62, 64 (stating single marijuana growing light "bums about as
much electricity as two twenty-one inch color televisions").
55 See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting bulbs
needed to grow marijuana indoors can result in temperatures in excess of 150 degrees),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994).
56 See, e.g., id. at 1057. "ITihe FLIR observation revealed that the covered window on the
third floor displayed an excessive amount of heat as did the roof and a skylight of the
residence." Id.; United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 208 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48
F.3d 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995). The court noted that the "video tape
made during the fly-over show[ed] that the metal building and a nearby brush pile were
considerably hotter than the surrounding land and woods." Id.; United States v. Porco, 842
F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (D. Wyo. 1994), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d
1497 (10th Cir. 1995). "[Tlhe reading of the front side of the house showed several hot spots
emanating from the front door and the roof of the residence." Id.; State v. Young, 867 P.2d
593, 595 (Wash. 1994). "The foundation of the home was shown to be warm in certain spots,
indicating the downstairs was warmer than the upstairs." Id.
57 See United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1472 (E.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd,
57 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995). "Probable cause was predicated-in part-upon the heat
emissions disclosed by the thermal imaging device." Id.
58 See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058 (discussing defendant's assertion that FLIR monitoring
without warrant constituted unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Fourth
Amendment); see also United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 230 (1994); United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1993); United
States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp.
1518, 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994); Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. at 1472; Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. at
209; Porco, 842 F. Supp. at 1396; United States v. Casanova, 835 F. Supp. 702, 705
(N.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 791 (D. Or. 1992), aff'd in part
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III. WHETHER USE OF THE FLIR CONSTITUTES A "SEARCH"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
A. FLIR Analysis Under the Expectation of Privacy Test
The threshold question in determining the constitutionality of
FLIR use for detection of indoor marijuana cultivation is whether
such detection constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.59 If this application of infrared technology is
not a "search," then the Fourth Amendment is simply not applica-
ble and consequently, the government need not show probable
cause for its use.6 ° On the other hand, if such utilization of the
FLIR is interpreted to be a "search," the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies and the government is required to make a showing of prob-
able cause.61
Courts that have addressed the constitutionality of FLIR use for
detection of indoor marijuana cultivation thus far have all applied
the "expectation of privacy" test to determine whether a "search"
occurred. The courts have varied the focus of the inquiry, how-
ever, and thus have divided on the issue of what constitutes a
search.62
and vacated in part, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F.
Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th
Cir. 1993); Young, 867 P.2d at 594; State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993).
59 See WHrrEBREAD, supra note 20, § 4.01 (noting preliminary question to be asked in
Fourth Amendment analysis).
60 See supra note 22 (noting Fourth Amendment limitations apply only to "searches" or
seizures").
61 See supra note 23 (noting "search" or "seizure" triggers application of Fourth Amend-
ment).
62 A number of courts have held that FLIR use to detect indoor marijuana growing does
not constitute a search. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1475 (E.D.
Wash. 1994), aff'd, 57 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393,
1400 (D. Wyo. 1994), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1947 (10th Cir.
1995); United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 792 (D. Or. 1992), aff'd in part and vacated
in part, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Deaner, Nos. 1:CR-92-0090-01 &
1:CR-92-0090-02, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046, at *11 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992); United
States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd sub nor. United
States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1993).
For courts holding that FLIR use to detect indoor marijuana growing does constitute a
search, see United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1519 (W.D. Wis. 1994); State v.
Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash. 1994).
Some courts have chosen not to decide the issue at all, primarily because they found that
probable cause existed independent of the FLIR evidence. See United States v. Olson, 21
F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 230 (1994); United States v. Deaner, 1
F.3d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Casanova, 835 F. Supp. 702, 708 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
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In finding that infrared detection of indoor marijuana growing
constitutes a "search," courts have channelled the expectation of
privacy inquiry to the activity in question, specifically, the actual
cultivating of marijuana. 63 These courts, having held that the in-
dividuals in question manifested a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the growing of marijuana, thus found the actions of law
enforcement officers to constitute a search. 4
For instance, in State v. Young, 65 the defendant sought to sup-
press evidence of a marijuana growth operation seized from his
home pursuant to a search warrant.66 FLIR heat readings of the
defendant's home were utilized to establish probable cause for a
search warrant.6 ' The defendant contended that as FLIR use in
and of itself required a warrant, any evidence obtained pursuant
to its warrantless use was inadmissible. 6 In holding that use of
the FLIR constituted a search, the Supreme Court of the state of
Washington reasoned that the defendant had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in his conduct while in his home. 9
In contrast, the courts which have held that FLIR detection of
indoor marijuana growing does not constitute a search have evalu-
ated the defendants' expectation of privacy in the heat emana-
tions.7 ° These courts have consistently and heavily relied on the
reasoning of the United States District Court of Hawaii in United
States v. Penny-Feeney.71 As in Young, the defendants in Penny-
63 See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash. 1994) (noting individual has reasonable
expectation of privacy in conduct occurring in home).
64 Id. at 604.
65 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
66 Id. at 595.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 603. "[Tlhe infrared thermal device allows the government to intrude into
the defendant's home and gather information about what occurs there. A resident has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in what occurs within the home." Id.
70 See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
664 (1994). "[11n this case there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in heat which Pin-
son voluntarily vented outside." Id.; United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1472-
73 (E.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 57 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995). "The question, then, is whether
the defendant's conduct reflected an expectation that the heat escaping from his marijuana
growing would remain private." Id.; United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (D.
Wyo. 1994) (analyzing reasonableness of defendants' "expectation of privacy in the heat
emanating from their residence"), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1947
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Deaner, Nos. 1:CR-92-0090-01 & 1:CR-92-0090-02, U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13046, *9 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992). "[T]here is no expectation of privacy as to
heat emanating from one's home." Id.; State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993) (examining "expectation of privacy with respect to any heat emanating from the
basement").
71 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Feeney sought to exclude evidence of marijuana growth obtained
pursuant to a search warrant partially based on heat readings ob-
tained by a FLIR.72 In applying the expectation of privacy test to
the heat emissions,73 the court held that the warrantless use of a
FLIR does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.7 4
In order to determine which of these approaches represents the
proper application of the expectation of privacy standard, one
must carefully examine the reasoning used by the Supreme Court
in Katz itself. There, the Supreme Court held that the
"[g]overnment's activities in electronically listening to and record-
ing the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he jus-
tifiably relied."75 The Court acknowledged petitioner's expectation
of privacy in the "words" he spoke7 6 or, more precisely, in the
message he was attempting to convey.77 Katz intended and ex-
pected the ideas he imparted to remain private .7 The individual
words themselves merely provided the vehicle for expressing those
ideas. The heart of Katz's communication was the meaning of the
words in their entirety to an officer of the law. For instance, if a
passerby who understood no English had overheard Katz's words,
it would not have constituted an invasion of Katz's privacy be-
cause the passerby would have been unable to decipher the under-
lying meaning of the words spoken.
Just as Katz's words only served to express his underlying
message, the defendants' use of heat only served to grow mari-
juana; thus, it is the actual growing which lies at the heart of their
expectation of privacy. 79 Therefore, the focus of the expectation of
privacy inquiry should be on the actual production of marijuana
and not the heat used to implement the growth. In these cases,
72 Id. at 225.
73 See id. at 226. 'The question under Katz thus becomes whether movants had a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in this 'heat waste.'" Id.
74 Id. at 228.
75 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).76 See id. at 352. "[Katz is] surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Id.
77 See id. at 352-61 (evidenced by repeated use of words "communication" and "conversa-
tion" in majority and concurring opinions); see also Cheryl K. Corrada, Comment, Dow
Chemical and Ciraolo: For Government Investigators the Sky's No Limit, 36 CATH. U. L.
REv. 667, 678 (1987) (noting Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy in "convey[ing] his
message").
78 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-61.
79 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (noting expectation of privacy was in
activity).
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the individuals' expectation of privacy in the growing of marijuana
is evidenced by their willingness to spend substantial sums of
money to grow it indoors, hidden from easy detection. 0 Although
the application of Katz's two-prong test to the marijuana growing
is troublesome because it allows for recognition of a reasonable
expectation of privacy while conducting an illegal activity, the ap-
plication of the expectation of privacy test to the heat emissions
seriously misconstrues the underpinnings of the test as set forth
in Katz.8 '
Penny-Feeney and its adherents have also disregarded another
indispensable aspect of the Katz opinion. In characterizing the
FLIR as a "passive, non-intrusive instrument" 2 which "does not
send any beams or rays into the area on which it is fixed or in any
way penetrate structures within that area,"8 3 Penny-Feeney re-
treats to the very notion abandoned by the Supreme Court in
Katz. Katz clearly withdrew Fourth Amendment analysis from
property law in holding that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people and not simply 'areas' . . . [and] that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physi-
cal intrusion .... 4
B. The FLIR's Unique Capabilities Require an Analysis
Without Resort to Analogies
The courts that have held that FLIR use for marijuana detec-
tion is not a search have repeatedly struggled to fit FLIR analysis
into existing analytical frameworks. 85 Like the infamous square
peg in the round hole, however, the fit is not a natural one. The
multiple problems with these analogies arise as a result of the
uniqueness of the FLIR. The capabilities of the FLIR, like those of
80 See Rosenthal, supra note 54, at 66 (noting cost of electricity for indoor growing opera-
tions is about $300 per month); see also Witkin, supra note 52, at 28 (noting indoor mari-juana growing requires "high-intensity lamps, conveyors, timers, fans, sprinklers and auto-
matic fertilizing systems").
81 Cf H. Paul Honsinger, Katz and Dogs: Canine Sniff Inspections and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 LA. L. Rev. 1093, 1103 (1984) (noting theory that dog sniff is of air space
around object rather than of object itself misconstrues reasonable expectation of privacy
test).
82 United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 223 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
83 Id.
84 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). "ITihe Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." Id.
85 See infra notes 86, 102.
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any new technological device, virtually demand that courts ap-
proach the analysis from a new and innovative perspective.
Courts have likened the heat emissions from a home to waste or
garbage placed on the street for collection. 6 In California v.
Greenwood,8 " the Supreme Court held that police searches of
sealed bags of garbage placed at curbside for collection are not
"searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 8 The
Greenwood Court found that the defendants had "placed their re-
fuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third
party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through
respondent's trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do
so. "19 Consequently, the Court determined that the defendants'
expectation of privacy in the contents of their garbage bags was
not objectively reasonable. 90
Greenwood's reasoning is inapplicable to FLIR detection of ma-
rijuana growing for several reasons.91 First, there is an inherent
difference between heat, which escapes naturally and automati-
cally, regardless of the wishes of the owner, and garbage, which
the owner must physically remove from the premises.9 2 In addi-
tion, even persons who vent heat from their homes clearly do not
do so in an effort to convey it to a third party.93
Furthermore, because garbage bags are commonly left at curb-
side, a person can rummage through another's trash without the
86 See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
664 (1994); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1474 (E.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd,
57 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1396-97 (D. Wyo.
1994), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1947 (10th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Deaner, Nos. 1:CR-92-0090-01 & 1:CR-92-0090-02, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046,
*7-*9 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992); Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226; State v. McKee, 510
N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
87 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
88 Id. at 37.
89 Id. at 40.
90 Id. at 40-41.
91 See, e.g., State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 602-03 (Wash. 1994) (rejecting rationales of
Greenwood as inapplicable to FLIR detection of heat produced by marijuana growing).
92 See Young, 867 P.2d at 602. "Heat, unlike garbage, automatically leaves a person's
home without any deliberate participation by the homeowner." Id.
93 See id. at 602-03. "Even if some heat is vented to the outside.., the device detects all
heat leaving the home, not just the heat directed out through the vent." Id. But see United
States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993). "Here, the record reveals that defendants
did not manifest an actual expectation of privacy in the heat waste since they voluntarily
vented it outside the garage where it could be exposed to the public...." Id. In such cases,
although the emanation of heat is somewhat more analogous to the removal of garbage, the
existence of a pure conveyance to a third party is still absent. Id.
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need to trespass on the premises. s4 It seems, however, that the
human senses could only detect heat emissions of the levels at is-
sue here from immediately next to a house, if at all. In most cases,
the police would be required to get a warrant in order to lawfully
be this close to the home.95 Thus, unlike the contents of a garbage
bag, the heat may be detected only through the use of a sophisti-
cated sense-enhancing device. 96 Indeed, law enforcement officials
would not resort to such an expensive, technologically advanced
method of detection if there were an easier alternative.97
The need for a high-tech device to detect heat obviates the fact
that ordinary citizens do not possess this capability. 98 While trash
on the street is easily accessible,9 9 the high cost of the FLIR ren-
ders it virtually unavailable to the general public. 100 Conse-
quently, a member of the public at large simply does not have the
means to evaluate heat emissions from another person's house as
easily as he could rummage through that person's trash.
A second analogy drawn by those courts holding that FLIR use
does not constitute a search is to compare the activity to the use of
dogs specially trained' 01  to sniff for narcotics. 10 2 Some courts
94 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (noting garbage bags were
collected from street in front of defendant's house).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1533 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (alluding to
distance from which FLIR can detect heat emissions).
96 See Lisa J. Steele, Waste Heat and Garbage: The Legalization of Warrantless Infrared
Searches, 29 CRIM. L. BULLETIN, 19, 29 (1993). "It takes no special senses or equipment for
an animal, child, scavenger, or snoop to examine a garbage container, other than perhaps a
strong stomach. However, the infrared emissions from the Peeney-Feeney home could only
have been detected with specialized commercial equipment." Id.
97 Cf Honsinger, supra note 81, at 1104. "If there were no difference between [a dog's
and an officer's nose], no rational law enforcement agency would invest the substantial
resources necessary to acquire, train, and maintain the animals." Id.
98 See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994). "[Ilt is difficult to say one should
expect other people to use sophisticated infrared instruments on one's home to view so-
called heat waste." Id.
99 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). "It is common knowledge that plastic
garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, chil-
dren, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." Id.
100 See Holton, supra note 5, at 52. The author states: "Some of the major defense con-
tractors have sought to move into law enforcement, but their FLIR systems can start at
about $750,000; commercial-grade FLIRs mounted in a gimbal start at closer to $125,000
.... Id.; cf Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 460 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
police officer's use of helicopter made his "ability to see over [defendant's] fence depend[ent]
on his use of very expensive and sophisticated piece of machinery to which few ordinary
citizens have access").
101 See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting "because of
their keen olfactory sense," dogs are commonly used to detect contraband).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 664 (1994); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd
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which have drawn this analogy have relied on United States v.
Place."'3 There, the Supreme Court held that a dog sniffing lug-
gage, not in the owner's possession does not constitute a search
requiring a warrant. 10 4 The Court characterized such a dog sniff
as non-intrusive because it "discloses only the presence or absence
of narcotics [and] the information obtained is limited."' °5 The
Court noted its "aware[ness] of no other investigative procedure
that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the
procedure."' °6
Other courts that have likened FLIR use to dog sniffs have re-
lied heavily on United States v. Solis.10 7 Solis involved the use of a
trained dog to detect the presence of marijuana odor emanating
from a publicly parked trailer.' In holding that this method of
detection did not constitute a search, the court reasoned that the
defendants should have expected the odor to emanate from the
trailer and, furthermore, that the dog search was neither offensive
nor embarrassing. 0 9
Comparing FLIR use to a dog sniff is flawed in several respects.
First, a drug sniffing dog can only detect the presence of narcotics
from a relatively short distance away.110 The FLIR's range of de-
tection, however, stems beyond the perimeter of the target prop-
erty, and thus can be used without the prior consent of the prop-
erty owner."'
sub nom. United States v. Feeney 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. McKee, 510
N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
103 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
104 See id. at 697-98. "[T]emporarily detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained
narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains nar-
cotics" does not constitute a search. Id. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal
of the conviction, on the ground that the DEA agents' detention of the luggage was for too
long a period of time. Id. at 710.
105 Id. at 707.
106 Id.; see also State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994). "The canine sniff is
distinct from other investigative procedures, both in the manner in which the evidence is
obtained and the content of the information revealed." Id.
107 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
108 Id. at 881.
109 Id. at 882-83.
110 See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1533 (W.D. Wis. 1994). 'ITihis court is
aware of no such canine capable of detecting and pinpointing the location of contraband at
a constant distance of 20 meters, let alone 200 meters." Id.; Solis, 536 F.2d at 881 (noting
dog's detection of marijuana from 25 yards away).
111 See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1533. "Thus, a homeowner has some protection from the
random use of a drug sniffing dog: unless the homeowner invites the police onto his prop-
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The second major distinction between dog sniffs and FLIR use
regards the intrusive nature of the latter.112 When sniffing a given
container, the dogs are trained to respond to the presence of a spe-
cific narcotic. 1 ' Subsequently, the dog will either signal, indicat-
ing the presence of narcotics, or not signal at all. In either in-
stance, the dog reveals no information regarding the remaining
contents of the container. 11 4 FLIRs, however, in detecting relative
amounts of heat radiating, reveal heat emanations from legal as
well as illegal sources within the home.1 5 Thus, FLIR is a more
intrusive detection technique than a dog sniff.1 16
The final distinction involves the inability of a FLIR operator to
draw any well-grounded conclusion from a heat reading. An of-
ficer using a drug sniffing dog may assuredly conclude whether
the target of the sniff contains contraband based on the presence
or absence of the dog's signal. 1 Conversely, the strongest conclu-
sion that a FLIR operator may draw is that the target house is
emitting a relatively greater amount of heat than a neighboring
home. Otherwise, the FLIR fails to provide any concrete informa-
tion as to the actual presence or absence of a growth operation
since the heat could be generated by any one of a number of
sources.' 18 Even assuming the heat is being generated by a heat
lamp, use of such a lamp is not per se illegal.
erty (or they have some other legal right to be present), the dog must operate outside the
limits of the curtilage, which typically would prevent an unconsented search." Id.
112 See United States v. Deaner, Nos. 1:CR-92-0090-01 & 1:CR-92-0090-02, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13046 at *11 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992). "[T]he FLIR is incapable of providing
definitive information as to what is happening behind closed doors other than the genera-
tion of heat. A marijuana-sniffing dog, on the other hand, gives a decisive indication as to
the presence of an illegal substance behind closed doors." Id.
113 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983) (indicating dog reacted
positively to presence of cocaine in luggage).
114 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707. "[T]he sniff only discloses the presence or absence of nar-
cotics, a contraband item." Id.; United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976)
(noting testimony indicated marijuana-sniffing dogs were "extremely reliable").
115 See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1525 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (noting dehu-
midifier within closet was mistaken for marijuana growth operation). "[T]he thermal
imager picks up information of lawful activities as well as unlawful." Id. at 1519.
116 See id. at 1533. "[A] properly trained drug sniffing dog is more precise than a heat
imager because the dog is trained to alert only to contraband. A thermal imager visualizes
all the heat it registers, regardless of the source of the radiation." Id.
117 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing accuracy and reliability of
trained narcotics dogs).
11s See, e.g., Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1520 n.7. "[Tihere is no doubt that a properly trained
operator using a thermal imager could, under appropriate conditions, detect if a guest room
was radiating heat, indicating that a visitor was present, or could detect heat radiating
from a bathroom as a result of the prolonged presence of hot water from a bath or shower
and/or heat lamps, or could detect heat from a television near the window of the living
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IV. A NEW PROPOSED TEST
The problematic nature of the "expectation of privacy" test, 119 as
applied to the constitutionality of police use of new technology, 2 °
demonstrates the need for a new and more appropriate threshold
to be met by government agencies prior to the use of surveillance
or investigative devices.' 2 ' To determine whether use of a given
technological device constitutes a "search" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, courts should engage in a two-part in-
quiry. Courts should first examine whether the device or method
used reveals only the presence or absence of illegal activity. If so,
secondly, courts should determine whether the information ob-
tained from the device is conclusive as to the presence of illegal
activity.
The following hypothetical illustrates the operation of such an
inquiry. Assume there exists a device capable of detecting cocaine
within any structure. The device would only reveal whether co-
caine is present without providing any other information as to the
container's contents. Furthermore, a positive reading would mean
that cocaine is definitely present. With this instrument, a police
officer could readily ascertain whether a given house contained co-
caine without interfering with the resident's use of the premises,
and without revealing any other information regarding the con-
tents of the home. Such a device, by providing conclusive informa-
tion solely as to illegal activity within the home, would satisfy
both prongs of our proposed standard.
Presently, no device exists which satisfies this test. However,
as technology progresses and assuming such a device is created, it
room, indicating which room in the house was in use by the occupants." Id.; State v. Young,
867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994). "The device can detect a human form through an open
window when the person is leaning against a curtain, and pressing the curtain between the
window screen and his or her body." Id. "The device can also detect the warmth generated
by a person leaning against a relatively thin barrier such as a plywood door." Id.
119 See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 133, 152 (finding Katz test "satisfactory in the context of Katz"
but providing little help in resolving how to apply Fourth Amendment to more difficult
situations); Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE
L.J. 1461, 1473-74 (1977). "This use of the Harlan [two-prong expectation of privacy] test
produces confused and unprincipled judicial decisions." Id.
120 See John R. Dixon, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance and the Open View Doctrine:
Florida v. Riley, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 157, 162 (1989) (recognizing difficulty in applying
reasonable expectation of privacy test to advancing technology such as aerial surveillance).
121 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (indicating that courts currently apply the
expectation of privacy test).
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should be used without Fourth Amendment limitation 122 in the
interest of stemming the unbridled flow of crime.123 A police officer
could constitutionally use such an instrument without a search
warrant or probable cause to scan a home for the presence or ab-
sence of illegal activity. 124 If, on the other hand, the device also
detects legal activity, the risk of intrusion on fundamental consti-
tutional rights dictates that law enforcement officials could not
constitutionally use it without first obtaining a search warrant.
Our proposed threshold is based upon the principles which the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment intended the provision to en-
compass. 125 Courts have repeatedly emphasized the Framers' in-
tent to protect the innocent, which may incidentally result in the
protection of the guilty as well. 126 The Framers thus protected the
rights of all persons, law-abiding or not, as a "necessary evil."' 27
Therefore, the use of a device capable only of conclusively de-
tecting a particular illegal activity should pass constitutional
muster, since it would ensnare only those persons who violate the
law.
Many people are likely to disagree with this proposal because it
would allow use of such a device on the home. Although the home
and the activities conducted therein have traditionally received
greater protection from governmental intrusion,12 the notion that
122 Cf Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1246 (1983). [I]f a device could be invented that accurately detected
weapons and did not disrupt the normal movement of people, there could be no Fourth
Amendment objection to its use." Id.
123 See Cooper, supra note 7, at 243 (noting rise in federal spending from $1.5 billion in
1981 to almost $12 billion in 1992 to combat drugs).
124 United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930). "If the search is permitted at
all, perhaps it does not make so much difference what is taken away, since the officers will
ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate, and there can be no sound policy
in protecting what does." Id.
125 See LANDYNsm, supra note 14, at 176. "The general object of the search and seizure
provision is to protect the right of privacy as exercised by law abiding citizens, and to
whatever degree and in whatever connection the right of privacy is unlawfully used for
criminal activity, to that extent the protection of the Constitution should not apply." Id.;
Loewy, supra note 122, at 1230. "[A] guilty person, lacking the right to secrete evidence, is
essentially an incidental beneficiary of a rule designed to benefit somebody else-an inno-
cent person who is not before the court." Id.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). Justice Frankfurter noted that "[bly the Bill of Rights the founders of this country
subordinated police action to legal restraints, not in order to convenience the guilty but to
protect the innocent." Id.
127 See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text (noting Framers' intent to protect
only innocent persons).
128 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (emphasizing "overriding respect
for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of
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"a man's home is his castle" is certainly not absolute. 129 Moreover,
this notion evolved at a time when the only method of police inves-
tigation was actual physical entry of the premises to be
searched. 13 0 It was the continuous breaking into and ransacking
of dwellings that gave rise to the establishment of such a strict
doctrine in the protection of the home.'- 1 Although courts have
correctly recognized that a search may occur absent physical in-
trusion, 3 2 the underpinnings of the "home as castle" view are far
less applicable in today's world of infinitely more sophisticated in-
vestigatory tools, where a scanning that reveals no illegal activity
does not disturb the individual.
This approach strikes a better balance between our dire societal
need for effective law enforcement on the one hand, and individual
privacy on the other.'3 3 The inability of the government to use a
device of this nature would serve to protect only the lawless, at the
expense of the law-abiding-a result the Founders certainly never
intended. It seems that with the advent of such devices as we hy-
pothesize, the "necessary evils" our forefathers were forced to bear
would remain "evil" but would no longer be "necessary."
the Republic"); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In
1766, William Pitt spoke these now-classic words: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid
defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may
blow through it-the storm may enter-but the King of England cannot enter-all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!" Id.; see also State v. Young, 867
P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994) (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984)). "A
resident has a reasonable expectation of privacy in what occurs within the home, 'a location
not open to visual surveillance.'" Id.
129 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191 (1990). "Absent some grave emergency,
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police.
This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activi-
ties." Id.; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986). "Of course, the right of privacy in
the home and its curtilage includes no right to engage in unlawful conduct there." Id.;
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 321 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). "The right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment relates in part of course to
the precincts of the home or the office. But it does not make them sanctuaries where the
law can never reach." Id.
130 See LANDYNSKi, supra note 14, at 200. "The men who wrote the Fourth Amendment
knew of only one type of search, that involving physical entry into a dwelling." Id.
131 See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting R. RUTLAND, THE
BIrH OF THE BIL OF RiGHTs, 1776-1791 25 (1955)). "The Bostonians complained that 'our
houses and even our bed chambers are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes, chests, and
trunks broke open, ravaged and plundered by wretches .... I"ld.; United States v. Poller,
43 F.2d 911,914 (2d Cir. 1930). "[Ilt is only fair to observe that the real evil aimed at by the
Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists in
rummaging about his effects to secure evidence against him." Id.
132 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting physical intrusion is no longer deci-
sive factor in determining existence of search).
133 Loewy, supra note 122, at 1234. "[T]he government's interest in seizing evidence of
crime is nothing short of compelling." Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment prevents the government from abusing
its police power. The advent of new technology and its subsequent
employment by law enforcement agencies result in a constant ju-
dicial struggle with the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Most re-
cently, its limits have been tested by use of the FLIR in detecting
indoor marijuana cultivation, resulting in varied reasoning and
thus differing holdings. The difficulties stem, at least in part,
from confusion surrounding the proper application of Katz's two-
prong test.
The problematic application of the Katz test, coupled with the
ever-growing danger to privacy resulting from use of sophisticated
technology, dictates the need for a new approach. A focus on the
intrusiveness and conclusiveness of the investigative device or
method will yield more consistent results. Devices like the FLIR,
which are capable of detecting perfectly legal activities and thus
fail to definitively indicate the presence of contraband put privacy
rights in grave jeopardy. In contrast, the use of an instrument or
method which, by its very nature, cannot disclose any more than
an illegal pursuit in which the individual is engaging, is not only
tolerable but desirable in light of the alarming incidence of crime
in our society.
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